# Safety Chain Solution - Magnetic switches 

## PLe, SIL 3

High diagnostic level with an optimized
implementation



## Function:

- Safety-related stop function initiated by any of the moveable guards that helps protect the access to the hazardous area.
- The opening of each guard is detected by using magnetic switches, which are checked by the safety module by means of a combination of contacts (normally closed and normally open).
- Opening of any of these guards causes the deactivation of the safety module outputs, which results in the switching-off of the motor power supply by means of the contactors K1 and K2 (stop category 0 according to EN/IEC 60204-1) to help prevent possible hazardous movements or states.
- The main contactors are monitored by the safety module to detect contact welding by means of the mirror contacts.
- The safety module also monitors the consistent actuation of the magnetic switch contacts to detect any failure, before restart of the machine movement is permitted.
- Opening or removal of the protective guard is detected by means of the coded magnetic switches, which are particularly useful for guards without accurate guidance and for use in difficult environments (dust, liquids, etc.).


## Typical applications:

- Assembling, packaging or similar compacted machines with a short rundown time and where the access to the hazardous area is very frequent.


## Safety Chain Solution - Magnetic switches

## Design:

- The safety function employs well-tried safety principles and is robust in the event of a component failure by means of two redundant contacts on the magnetic switch device and two redundant contactors (K1 and K2).
- The contact synchronization of the magnetic switches and contactor failure are detected by the safety module at the next demand upon the safety function.
- The start (S2) and the restart interlock (S1) pushbuttons must be located outside the hazardous area and at a point from which the potential danger is visible.
- The safety module satisfies the requirements for performance level PL e in accordance with EN ISO 13849-1 and SILCL 3 in accordance with EN/IEC 62061.
- The contactors (K1 and K2) are considered as well-tried components.
- Protection against overcurrent must be provided in accordance with EN/IEC 60947-4-1
- The contactors (K1 and K2) have mirror contacts in accordance with EN/IEC 60947-4-1, which are integrated into the feedback of the safety module L1 for fault detection.


## Related products

Switches, pushbuttons, emergency stop Harmony XB4
Switch mode Power supply - Phaseo ABL8
Safety Module - Preventa XPSDM
Coded magnetic system - Preventa XCSDM
Contactor - TeSys D
Modular beacon and tower light -
Harmony XVB


## Safety Chain Solution - Magnetic switches




Figure 1


Figure 2

## Chain structure:

- The circuit diagram SCS06/0310D is a conceptual schematic diagram and is limited to present the safety function with only the relevant safety components.
- For the designated architecture of the category 4 system, two redundant channels are implemented.
- The circuit arrangement can be divided into three function blocks, input (I), logic (L) and output (O) blocks, on each channel.
- The unbroken lines for monitoring symbolize the higher DCavg assumed for this category (see figure 1)
- Since each protective guard forms part of a dedicated safety function, the calculation of the performance level considers only one of them.
- The functional channel can be represented by a single guard switch device (B1) that corresponds to the input block (see figure 2).
- The safety module (XPSDMB) corresponds to the logic block (L1/2), which maintains the internal redundancy of the safety circuits required for this category.
- The output block is represented by two redundant contactors (K1 and K2) that are monitored by the logic block (safety module) to detect failure.
- The complete wiring must be in accordance to EN 60204-1 and provision to avoid short circuits has to be provided (EN ISO 13849-2 Table D.4).


# Safety Chain Solution - Magnetic switches 

## Safety level calculation:



|  |  | Values |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Channel 1 | Channel 2 |
| Input (magnetic switch) XCS | $\mathrm{B}_{10}$ (operations) | 50000000 | 50000000 |
|  | T10d (years) | 1578 | 1578 |
|  | MTTF ${ }_{\text {d }}$ (years) | 15782.8 | 15782.8 |
|  | MTTF resulting (years) | 2500 | 2500 |
|  | PFH ${ }_{d}$ resulting (1/h) | $9.05 \times 10^{-10}$ | $9.05 \times 10^{-10}$ |
|  | DC (\%) | 99 | 99 |
| Logic (safety module) XPSDMB | $\mathrm{PFH}_{\mathrm{d}}(1 / \mathrm{h})$ | $3.92 \times 10^{-9}$ | $3.92 \times 10^{-2}$ |
| Output (actuator) LC1 | B10 (operations) | 1000000 | 1000000 |
|  | \% dangerous failure | 73 | 73 |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \mathrm{B} 10_{\mathrm{d}} \\ & \text { (operations) } \end{aligned}$ | 1369863 | 1369863 |
|  | T10 ${ }_{\text {d }}$ (years) | 43 | 43 |
|  | MTTF $_{\text {d }}$ (years) | 432.4 | 432.4 |
|  | MTTF resulting (years) | 432.4 | 432.4 |
|  | PFH ${ }_{d}$ resulting (1/h) | $5.35 \times 10^{-9}$ | $5.35 \times 10^{-9}$ |
|  | DC (\%) | 99 | 99 |
| Safety function | MTTF $_{\text {dC }}$ | 67.8 (high) |  |
|  | DC ${ }_{\text {ang }}$ | 99 (high) |  |
|  | $\mathrm{PFH}_{d}$ resulting <br> (1/h) | $1.02 \times 10^{-8}$ |  |
|  | PL attained |  |  |
|  | SIL attained | 3 |  |

- A required performance level (PLr) must be specified for each intended safety function following a risk evaluation. The performance level ( PL ) attained by the control system must be validated by verifying if it is greater than or equal to the PLr.
- If the protective guard device is assumed to be actuated every 5 minutes during 220 working days per year and 12 working hours, the number of operations (nop) would be 31680.
- A B10d value of 50000000 cycles is stated for the coded magnetic switch. In accordance with the assumed above nop value, the MTTFd would be 15782.8 years for each channel. These values are limited to 2500 years in this case as this is the limit used by the SISTEMA calculation tool for category 4 systems.
- A PFHd value of $3.92 \times 10^{-9}$ is stated for the safety module (XPSDMB). This value comes directly from the safety device data and it is certified by an accepted standards body.
- For the redundant contactors K1 and K2, the B10 value corresponds under nominal load to an electrical lifetime of 1000 000 switching cycles. If $73 \%$ of failures are assumed to be dangerous, the B10d value is 1369863 operations. With the assumed value for nop, it results in a MTTFd of 432.4 years for each component. These values are not limited in this case as this is a category 4 systems and they are under the 2500 year limit used by the SISTEMA calculation tool.
- Measures against common cause failures must attain at least 65 points (i.e. separation (15), diversity (20), over voltage protection etc. (15) and environmental conditions ( $25+10$ )).
- Since this is the highest performance level, both the MTTFd of each channel and the DCavg must be high.
- The combination of channel 1 and channel 2 results in a DCavg $99 \%$ (high) as we are using magnetic switches with a NO/NC contact combination, and mirror contact monitoring for the contactors.
- The safety-related control system corresponds to category 4 with high MTTFd. The complete functional safety chain results in
average probability of dangerous failure (PFHd) of $1.02 \times 10^{-8}$.
- This corresponds to PL e and SIL 3.


## ATTENTION

The information provided in this documentation contains general descriptions and/or technical characteristics of the performance of the products contained herein. This documentation is not intended as a substitute for and is not to be used for determining suitability or reliability of these products for specific user applications.
It is the duty of any such user or integrator to perform the appropriate and complete risk analysis, evaluation and testing of the products with respect to the relevant specific application or use thereof. Neither Schneider Electric Industries SAS nor any of its affiliates or subsidiaries shall be responsible or liable for misuse of the information contained herein.

## Schneider Electric Industries S.A.S

